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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS






                     Petitioners,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT,
Attorney General of the United States;
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents
__________
On Petition for Review of An Order
from the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA Nos. A78-514-483 & A78-514-478)
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 28, 2004
___________
Before: ROTH, BARRY, and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed:   October 19, 2004)





Nighisti Woldermariam and her husband, Isaac Ghebretnsae Beletse, petition for
review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  That order affirmed
the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which had denied petitioners’ applications
for asylum, withholding of removal, and for protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”).  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We will deny the Petition
for Review.
I. 
Because we write only for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts of this
case in detail.  It is sufficient to note that this Petition originates from the ongoing conflict
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the root cause of which was Eritrea’s 30-year struggle for
independence, finally achieved in the early 1990s.  In May 1998, Ethiopia and Eritrea
again went to war, and Ethiopia began persecuting its citizens of Eritrean descent by
revoking business licenses, dismissing them from government jobs, and deporting them. 
Among those deported by Ethiopia were Woldermariam and Beletse, as well as their two
children and Beletse’s mother, based on their Eritrean descent. 
Upon arriving in Eritrea, the Eritrean authorities detained Woldermariam for two
hours because she was unable to establish her Eritrean origin.  Only after her husband and
mother-in-law also testified to her Eritrean descent did the Eritrean authorities allow her
to rejoin her family.  Woldermariam has testified, moreover, that she endured further
1Petitioners’ nationality at birth and citizenship has not been determined, notwithstanding
the admitted allegations in the NTAs.  The confusion stems from petitioners’ initial and revised
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hostility while living in Eritrea.  Specifically, because she was from the Tigray region in
Ethiopia, the Eritreans viewed her with suspicion and hatred, thus creating an
uncomfortable and precarious situation.  The real source of friction, though, between
Woldermariam and Beletse and the Eritrean authorities was Beletse’s refusal to report for
duty upon being conscripted into the Eritrean military.  
When Beletse failed to report for duty, allegedly because he considered the war
against Ethiopia unjust, the Eritrean police, on three separate occasions, came to his home
in search of him.  During the last of the three visits, the police forced their way into the
home, and when Woldermariam asserted that she had no knowledge of her husband’s
whereabouts, the police beat her with their fists and kicked her.  After this incident,
Woldermariam and Beletse decided to flee Eritrea, leaving their children behind to live
with Beletse’s mother.  They first settled in Sudan for four months and then Nairobi for
fifteen months before finally entering the United States on or about April 3, 2001.  
Because Woldermariam and Beletse entered the United States without valid entry
documents, the INS filed Notices to Appear (“NTAs”) on April 13, 2001, alleging that
Woldermariam and Beletse were natives and citizens of Eritrea and charging them with
being subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A).  Woldermariam and Beletse
admitted the allegations in the NTAs and conceded removability, but requested asylum,
withholding of removal and protection under the CAT.1 
asylum applications, which state that Beletse is a native of Ethiopia and a citizen of Eritrea and
Woldermariam is a native and citizen of Ethiopia.
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At the merits hearing on December 27, 2002, the IJ, in an oral decision, found that
Woldermariam and Beletse were not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal or
protection under the CAT.  Thereafter, Woldermariam and Beletse appealed to the BIA. 
The BIA first found that they had failed to establish past persecution, a well-founded fear
of future persecution, or a clear probability of persecution or torture upon their return to
Eritrea.  In particular, the BIA, accepting as true both Beletse’s forced conscription and
Woldermariam’s beating by the Eritrean authorities, determined that neither event
amounted to persecution and, in any event, had not been based on a protected ground.  The
BIA also found that Woldermariam failed to establish persecution based on the mere fact
that her Eritrean neighbors viewed her with suspicion due to her Tigray ethnicity.  Further,
while the background materials described ethnic tensions and incidents of violence toward
Ethiopian deportees during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, the BIA found that Woldermariam
and Beletse failed to establish that a reasonable person in such circumstances would fear
persecution. 
Additionally, in response to Woldermariam and Beletse’s argument that the IJ
erroneously concluded that they were citizens of Eritrea, thus ignoring their request for
protection from Ethiopia, the BIA noted that they had, at best, only ambiguously raised a
claim for protection from Ethiopia.  The BIA then concluded that, even if they properly
raised such a claim, it would deny their requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and
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relief under the CAT, for involuntary deportation, alone, does not rise to the level of
persecution, nor did the background materials establish a reasonable possibility of
persecution or torture upon their return to Ethiopia.  
The BIA, upon taking administrative notice of the 2002 Country Report, observed
that the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea ended in June 2000, and Ethiopia had ceased
their policy of detention and forced exile for Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean descent.  2002
Country Report at 1-2, 9, 18-19, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18203.htm.  Consequently, the BIA dismissed
their appeal and ordered them removed to Eritrea or, in the alternative, to Ethiopia.  This
Petition for Review followed.
II.
 Section 208(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b), provides that the Attorney General
has discretion to grant asylum to refugees.  The INA defines a refugee as a person who is
unable or unwilling to return to his country “because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  The asylum applicant
bears the burden of establishing that he satisfies these requirements.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)
(2003).  
To successfully petition for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A), an alien must “show that if returned to his country, it is more likely than
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not that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Amanfi v.
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 2003); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  Inasmuch
as establishing eligibility for withholding of removal requires a showing of a “clear
probability of persecution,” the standard for withholding of removal is more stringent
than the standard for asylum.  Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001).
To qualify for relief under the United Nations CAT, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), an
applicant must prove that he is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of
removal, a standard which is also more stringent than the standard for asylum. 
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§
208.16(c)(2) & (4)).  
Where, as here, the BIA did not expressly adopt or defer to the IJ’s findings, we
review only the decision of the BIA.  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548-49 (3d Cir.
2001).  Under the governing law, we must ascertain whether the BIA’s factual
determinations are supported by substantial evidence.  Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210,
216 (3d Cir. 1998).  In Abdille v. Ashcroft, we held that “‘persecution’ and ‘well-founded
fear of persecution’ are all findings of fact that we review under the deferential
substantial evidence standard” and the BIA’s findings must be upheld “unless the
evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  242 F.3d 477, 483-84
2Because the standards for prevailing on a withholding of removal claim and a request for
relief under the Convention are more stringent than the standard applicable to an asylum
application, denial of petitioners’ asylum applications by definition compels denial of petitioners’
withholding of removal and Convention relief claims.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463,
469-70 (3d Cir. 2003).
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(3d Cir. 2001).  We will reverse “only if a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude
that the requisite fear of persecution existed.”  Id. at 484 (citation omitted). 
III.
Applying the deferential substantial evidence standard to this Petition, we
conclude that Woldermariam and Beletse have failed to demonstrate that “any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude” that they were entitled to asylum. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).2  Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determinations that
Woldermariam and Beletse failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution.
A. Past Persecution
 To establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution, a petitioner must
prove not only that he or she has actually suffered persecution, but also that such
persecution was on account of one of the statutorily protected grounds.  Abdulrahman v.
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d at 592; Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 167-68 (3d Cir. 2003). 
We have previously held that persecution is an “extreme concept” that “does not
encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or
unconstitutional.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); Lukwago, 329 F.3d at
3Petitioners attempt to introduce “new information” indicating that the police not only
beat Woldermariam, but raped her as well.  We will not consider this new information because it
was not considered by the BIA.  See Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir.1989) (noting
that this Court may not consider particular issues not raised in an appeal to the Board).
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168-69.  Rather, we have defined persecution as including “threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or
freedom.” Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 168 (quoting Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir.
2001)).  For the reasons that follow, the factual events upon which Woldermariam and
Beletse rely in arguing for asylum do not rise to the level of persecution.  
First, insofar as Beletse claims persecution based upon his forced conscription into
the Eritrean military, the BIA properly rejected that claim.  We have previously
recognized the general notion “‘that a sovereign nation enjoys the right to enforce its laws
of conscription, and that penalties for evasion are not considered persecution.’” Lukwago,
329 F.3d at 169-70 (quoting M.A. v. United States INS, 899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir.1990)
(en banc )).  
Second, the purported beating of Woldermariam by the Eritrean authorities, a
solitary incident causing no serious injuries, does not evince conduct so severe that it
constitutes a real threat to life or freedom.3  Even assuming that the beating was severe
enough to constitute persecution, Woldermariam has nonetheless failed to show that such
beating was on account of a protected ground under the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)),
and was not based on the mere fact that the Eritrean authorities thought she was
deliberately lying to protect her husband, as determined by the BIA.  That distinction is
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crucial here, and while Woldermariam argues that “it can safely be assumed that at least a
partial motive for here [sic] physical and psychological abuse was due to her ethnic
background and as a result of a political opinion imputed to her as a result of her
association with her husband,” mere conjecture will not suffice.  Pet.’s Br. at 31.  The
administrative record is devoid of any evidence tending to establish the requisite nexus
between the beating and a protected ground set forth in the statute.  Because forced
conscription, without more, is not persecution, the ill-treatment Woldermariam received
based on her husband’s evasion of the conscription process cannot be held to constitute
persecution.  
 Third, the involuntary deportation by the Ethiopian authorities of Woldermariam
and Beletse does not constitute persecution.  Such involuntary deportation by Ethiopia to
Eritrea (a country which previously had been part of Ethiopia and the place where both
Beletse and Woldermariam’s father were from) during a time of war between Eritrea and
Ethiopia, while perhaps unfair or unjustified, does not, in our view, come within the
narrow parameters of conduct so extreme as to constitute persecution.  See Fatin, 12 F.3d
at 1240.
Finally, the other events cited by Woldermariam–the temporary detainment upon
arrival in Eritrea and the hostile social environment–are not sufficiently serious to rise
beyond the level of harassment.  As such, we conclude that Woldermariam and Beletse
have failed to establish past persecution. 
4Petitioners do not appear to challenge the BIA’s finding that they failed to establish a
well-founded fear of future persecution if they are removed to Ethiopia, as opposed to Eritrea. 
Issues not raised and argued in an opening brief are deemed abandoned and waived.  See Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).  In any event, relying on the more recent Country
Report from 2002, the BIA noted that Ethiopia has ceased its practice of involuntary deportation
of Ethiopians of Eritrean descent.  We agree that this defeats any claim of future persecution
based upon removal to Ethiopia.
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B. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution4
An applicant who fails to demonstrate past persecution may still qualify for asylum
by showing that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion if
returned to his or her native country.  The term “well-founded fear has both a subjective
and objective component.”  Abdille, 242 F.3d at 495-96.  An applicant must “show that he
has a subjective fear of persecution that is supported by objective evidence that
persecution is a reasonable possibility.” Id. at 496 (citation omitted).  As in Abdille, here
there is no challenge to petitioners’ subjective fear of persecution.  However, the question
remains whether that fear is objectively reasonable.  On appeal, Woldermariam and
Beletse have the burden of showing that the record would compel a reasonable
adjudicator to find that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution based on an
enumerated statutory ground. 
The BIA, citing to the evidence of country conditions in the record, concluded that
Woldermariam and Beletse did not establish that they have a well-founded fear of future
persecution, finding that a reasonable person in their circumstances would not fear
5Beletse bases this claim, in part, on his purported submission of a 2004 document which
purportedly indicates that “those who flee the conscription process may be jailed or even
disappeared [sic].”  Pet.’s Br. at 38.  As this document was not part of the record reviewed by the
BIA, we do not consider it.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).  
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persecution.  Woldermariam and Beletse have not identified any record evidence that
would compel a reversal of this finding.  
Beletse contends that he will suffer disproportionate punishment for evading the
conscription process, thus establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution.  It is
true that in certain situations where the refusal to serve in the military results not in
normal draft evasion penalties, but rather in disproportionately severe punishment, such
punishment might constitute persecution.  This case, however, does not present one of
those situations. 
 Beletse’s fear of disproportionately severe punishment lacks evidentiary support. 
At the very least, the record evidence does not require the abandonment of the general
principle, applied by the BIA, that forced military conscription does not constitute
persecution.5  Similarly, Woldermariam’s objective basis for fear of future persecution
rests on her past experience of physical abuse and the uncomfortable social environment
she experienced in Eritrea.  The BIA, however, concluded that such conduct does not
constitute persecution.  Accordingly, Woldermariam’s reliance on that conduct to
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution is unavailing.  
 We therefore hold that the BIA’s conclusions that Woldermariam and Beletse
failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution are
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supported by substantial evidence.
We will DENY the Petition for Review of the BIA’s decision.
 
